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Justice Marshall. They felt that since the end result of a juvenile hearing might
be incarceration at a state institution, the proceedings were in effect criminal
and a trial by jury should be afforded the offender. The dissent does not seem to
recognize the main purpose behind the juvenile system and the reasons for
distinguishing between an adult and juvenile offender. As Mr. Justice White
so aptly stated in his concurring opinion:
The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have
a will and are responsible for their actions. A finding of guilt estab-
lishes that they have chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and
injurious to others and that they must be punished to deter them and
others from crime. Guilty defendants are considered blameworthy; they
are branded and treated as such, however much the State also pursues
rehabilitative ends in the criminal justice system.
For the most part, the juvenile justice system rests on more deter-
ministic assumptions. Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed
the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of environmental
pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control.
Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile de-
linquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so
blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him or others.13
GEORGE PAPPAS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS-DEFENDANT'S STATE-
MENT, OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA SAFEGUARDS, CAN BE USED FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.-In Harris v. New York,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that evidence could be used for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of the defendant, even though that same evidence could not be used
in the prosecution's case in chief. The information which Harris sought to have
excluded had been obtained in violation of the Miranda safeguards.2
Harris was charged on a two-count indictment of selling heroin. At trial,
an undercover police officer testified that Harris had sold him heroin on two
occasions. A second officer verified details of the sale, and finally a third officer
offered testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin. Harris then took
the stand and testified that all he sold the officers was baking powder. On cross-
13 Id. at 4785.
1 39 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court set down minimum
standards which must be exercised by law enforcement officials during custodial inter-
rogation:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
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examination the prosecution introduced damaging prior inconsistent statements
made by Harris. These statements were barred from being introduced into evi-
dence in the prosecution's case in chief because defendant had not properly
waived his rights under Miranda. Harris was found guilty, and his conviction
was upheld on appeal.
The Supreme Court affirmed Harris's conviction in an opinion which failed
to come to grips with certain issues, and was based at least in part upon Walder
v. United States," a decision easily distinguishable from Harris. In Walder the
court held that physical evidence could be used for the purpose of impeachment
even though it had been suppressed in a previous case. Walder during his trial
made the statement that he had never possessed narcotics. The prosecution then
produced narcotics found on Walder in a previous arrest. Those narcotics were
suppressed in the previous trial because Walder's fourth amendment rights had
been violated.
Although state and lower federal courts have dealt with the same or analo-
gous situations as those presented in Harris and Walder,4 the Supreme Court
never touched upon the subject matter again during the intervening years. The
purpose of this note is to analyze Harris and to attempt to explain some of the
inconsistencies in the majority opinion. There can be no doubt but that the
Supreme Court came a long way from Walder to Harris, and it did so in a
superficial manner, leaving many pertinent questions unanswered.
While Harris does not deal with exclusionary rule, it is important to note
at the outset the effect of the rule on this case. The exclusionary rule was first
developed in 1886 in Boyd v. United States,5 and then more concretely estab.
lished in 1914 by Weeks v. United States.6 In Weeks the Court voiced concern
that without the exclusionary rule the "right to be secure against searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution."' 7 This concern was prompted by
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments of the Constitution and the sub-
sequent use of the fruits of these violations. The Court, again prompted by that
same concern, stated in Elkin v. United States8 and Mapp v. Ohio9 respectively,
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it."' 0
8 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966); Bailey v. United
States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir.
1968) ; People v. Luma, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967).
5 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7 Id. at 393.
8 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
9 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 Id. at 656.
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In view of the reason as stated in Mapp and Elkin, it is clear that the pri-
mary purpose of the exclusionary rule was to act as a deterrent to improper
police conduct. The deterring factor was noted in earlier cases, particularly
Weeks, which realized that the constitutional guarantees were meaningless if
there was no effective way of preventing their violation. The means by which
constitutional protection could be insured was to exclude the end product of
police misconduct, thereby frustrating such activity.
For-the most part, early cases which involved the use of the exclusionary
rule dealt with the fourth amendment violations. The reliability of the evidence
being introduced in these cases was not in issue.1 Walder was such a case; it
concerned exclusion of physical evidence gained in violation of petitioner's con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. But in
Harris the verbal statements attributed to the defendant were not necessarily
as reliable as the physical evidence excluded in Walder. Harris' incriminating
statements were given in violation of the Miranda decision, and their reliability
could be questioned. The Harris opinion recognized a possible disparity between
the two cases on this point when it said that the statement may only be used
"if its trustworthiness satisfies legal standards."'1 2 But what does this statement
mean? Does it mean that confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are
"trustworthy" as a matter of law? Although this would seem to be the answer
since Harris' statement was allowed into evidence to impeach his testimony, the
more logical inference is that the evidence is presumed to be reliable until the
defendant shows circumstances that tend to indicate unreliability.
The statement made by the majority that "petitioner makes no claim that
the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary"'13 seems to in-
dicate that the defendant would have to raise doubts as to the reliability of the
statement or else it will be presumed to be reliable.
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda stated:
The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately,
relegated to the past or to any part of the country. Only recently in
Kings County, New York, the police brutally beat, kicked and placed
lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness . ..
The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now, but
they are sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern. 14
The Court went on in Miranda to state that "custodial interrogation carries
its own badge of intimidation"'15 and left no doubt that confessions under these
conditions must be excluded not only as a means of deterring improper
11 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1948) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1949).
12 39 U.S.L.W. at 4282.
Is Id.
14 384 U.S. at 446, 447.
15 Id. at 457.
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police conduct but also because of the "compulsion inherent in custodial sur-
roundings."''
It appears that after Harris the defendant will have to point to specific
reasons which make his statements unreliable if he wishes to have them excluded
for all purposes. To conclude that all confessions obtained in violation of
Miranda are unreliable would be an unreasonable assumption. In United States
v. Fox,17 for example, the defect consisted of telling the defendant that "he
didn't have to make any statement"' 8 rather than the more proper form that you
"have a right to remain silent."'19 In addition, defendant was not told about
his right to be represented by an attorney even if he was not able to afford one.
While it is clear that the procedure was not entirely proper it is doubtful whether
the addition to or correction of the form used would have made defendant's
subsequent statement more reliable. In Proctor v. United States,20 defendant had
the Miranda warnings read to him. While he was at the police station, he was
asked whether or not he was employed. At the time, the question seemed innocent
enough, one not likely to be considered significant by either the police or de-
fendant. His answer was excluded because there had not been a waiver of de-
fendant's rights. The procedure was not proper, but it would be difficult to brand
the defendant's response as inherently unreliable.
Another distinction between Harris and Walder was that in Walder the
defendant was impeached as to collateral matters, while Harris was impeached
on matters directly bearing on his present trial. The Court did not consider this
distinction except to point out that they didn't think it important.21 The relevance
of such a disinction, however, is most important in determining the manner in
which the evidence is used by the jury. The purpose which impeachment is to
serve, at least theoretically, is to impugn the credibility of the witness, not to
establish the guilt of the defendant. But the danger of allowing evidence intended
for impeachment, no matter what purpose it is supposed to serve, is that it will
be used by the jury for all purposes, including passing upon the defendant's
guilt or innocence. The jury is warned what restricted use must be made of
impeachment evidence, 22 but any attempt to determine what a jury does with
the evidence which reaches it, would be at best, conjectural.
16 Id. at 445.
17 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968).
18 Id. at 99.
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
20 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
21 39 U.S.L.W. at 4282. The Court said:
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in hisdirect examination, whereas here he was impeached as to testimony hearing moredirectly on the crime charged. We are persuaded that there is a difference in
principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder.
22 The jury was warned by the trial judge that the statement atttributed to Harris
could only be considered by them to determine Harris' credibility, and not as evidence of
his guilt.
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In Walder, the prosecution introduced for impeachment purposes evidence
showing that defendant possessed narcotics at a previous time. This was done to
point out the discrepancy in the defendant's current statement that he never in
his life possessed narcotics. This evidence, no doubt, helped to convict Walder.
But the important distinction is that the evidence tended to discredit the veracity
of Walder more than it proved his guilt. While in Harris, the statement in ques-
tion could easily be used not only for purposes of credibility, but also directly
to prove the guilt of the defendant.
Another questionable aspect of the court's reliance upon Walder deals with
a statement in the body of the Walder decision:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to
deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence ille-
gally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.28
It is impossible to reconcile the stand in Harris with the above statement in
Walder. The court in Harris did not attempt to explain any distinction. The
language in Walder was not essential to the result reached, so it could be con-
sidered dictum. But whether it was dictum, or an overruling of Walder sub
silentio, the overriding policy which produced Walder is not present in Harris.
In Walder the court's policy was that the defendant should be able to take the
stand without fear of being impeached by illegal evidence concerning the ele-
ments of the crime of which he was being charged. The Harris approach ap-
parently is that the defendant has the right to take the stand and deny all the
elements of the crime against him. But this right will not stand as a shield to
his own lies; the defendant has no right to perjure himself. There is nothing
in Harris which restricts the defendant from testifying; only the manner in
which he does so, that is, he may not testify untruthfully.
The Harris decision poses one other problem. Assuming that a confession
obtained in violation of the safeguards provided in Miranda is reliable, the
question remains whether the exclusion of confessions for purposes of the prose-
cution's case in chief alone will remain an adequate deterrent to police mis-
conduct. The majority in Harris refers to the encouragement of impermissible
police conduct through the use of the fruits of such conduct as a "speculative
possibility." The dissent in Harris, on the other hand, feels that:
The Court today tells the police that they may freely interrogate
an accused incommunicado and without counsel and know that al-
though any statement they obtain in violation of Miranda can't be
used on the State's direct case, it may be introduced if the defendant
has the temerity to testify.2 4
23 347 U.S. at 65.
24 39 U.S.L.W. at 4284.
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Whether or not Harris will encourage the police to improper conduct is
speculative and only time will provide an answer. But Justice Black's view in
the dissent appears to go too far. He implies that the police will be free to
violate Miranda and know their evidence so gained will be proper for impeach-
ment. This does not take into consideration the language of the majority con-
cerning the "trustworthiness" of the evidence. Custodial interrogation over an
extended period, or even a short interrogation without any warnings, may very
well raise doubts as to the reliability of the evidence.
THOMAS REMICK

